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1 Introduction
Games with strategic complementarities (see Amir [], Vives [], among others) are based
on two fundamental properties: (i) the ability to order the elements of the players’ strat-
egy sets; and (ii) the strategic complementarity which implies upward sloping best replies
(see Topkis [], Cooper []). Contrary to the topologically oriented approaches that gener-
ally require quasiconcavity of each utility function in own action, the properties of games
with strategic complementarities release the reliance on mixed strategies to ensure the
existence of a Nash equilibrium.
Games with strategic complementarities in which the joint best reply correspondence is
Veinott increasing (Veinott [], Calciano []) rely on Zhou’s [] extension of Tarski ﬁxed
point theorem (Tarski []) to set-valued maps. Earlier attempts that aim to generalize
games with strategic complementarities have mainly concentrated on the increasingness
notions (see Antoniadou [], Calciano []). In particular, recently, using the notions of up-
per and lower increasingness (Smithson []) which are substantially weaker than Veinott
increasingness, Calciano [] has presented games with general complementarities and
g-modular games that retain the main properties of supermodular games. On the other
hand, among those very few attempts to extend the set of strategy sets, d’Orey [] has
employed quasilattices while requiring even a stronger notion of increasingness than that
of Veinott []. A notion of quasilattices has also been introduced by Calciano [], and
this notion has been linked to that of lattices by means of speciﬁc theorems, contrary to
the notion of d’Orey []. Speciﬁcally, Calciano [] has provided the conditions under
which quasilattices and sublattices coincide after showing that the set of maximizers of a
g-modular function on a lattice is a quasilattice.a
The purpose of this paper is to further extend the theory and the scope of application of
games with strategic complementarities. Extending the set of games with (weak) general
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complementarities (see Calciano []) to include games with complete partially ordered
(CPO) strategy sets, our aim is to provide a weaker structure on the set of strategy pro-
ﬁles. To do so, we show that the ﬁxed point set of an order-preserving set-valued map
on a CPO is itself a nonempty CPO. Note that the nonemptiness of the ﬁxed point set
already follows from Abian and Brown [] and from Smithson [], whereas the exis-
tence of the least ﬁxed point follows from Stouti []. However, we present short proofs
in the way that Echenique [] has proved Tarski [] and Zhou [] ﬁxed point theorems
by means of transﬁnite recursion. Beside the existence result, the approach may provide
a convenient way of construction towards the least Nash equilibrium. For this approach,
we assume that the correspondence satisﬁes a certain notion of increasingness (Calciano
[]) weaker than that of Veinott [], hence than that of Stouti []. Also, we require that
the correspondence has a bottom element for eachmember of its domain. As for the result
on the order structure, we additionally prove that the chains in the ﬁxed point set have a
supremum.
The contribution of this paper consists in showing that the theory of games with gen-
eral complementarities developed by Calciano [] can be shown to hold in the context
of CPOs as well. In particular, the paper analyzes the existence and the order structure
of Nash equilibria for extended (semi-) uniform g-modular games in which the strategy
space is a CPO, and the joint best reply correspondence satisﬁes monotonicity require-
ments weaker than that of Veinott.
As the strategy set of each player is no longer required to be a complete lattice, our re-
sults prove to be crucial in providing the existence of equilibrium for the games in which
at least one of the players has a multidimensional strategy set and faces a form of budget
constraint, or capacity constraint, or law regulation that makes some of her strategies in-
feasible or unavailable. For instance, if such constraints are introduced into multi-stage
R&Dmodels (Amir []), or into Bertrand competition with pricing and advertising (Vives
[], Calciano []), or into generalized contest games (Acemoglu and Jensen []), the strat-
egy set would no longer be a lattice, but aCPO. In particular, in a generalized contest game,
the players make two types of costly eﬀort, each corresponding to a separate contest. One
contest can correspond to an educational competition while the other can represent com-
petition in sports.b Since the total amount of eﬀort that can bemade by players is bounded
from above, the maximum amount cannot be exerted for both type of contests. Thus, the
strategy set ceases to be a lattice. For such cases, the existence of equilibrium cannot be
veriﬁed by the existing results in the context of games with strategic complementarities.
However, utilizing games with general complementarities, we show that the set of equi-
librium is indeed a nonempty CPO.
The article is organized as follows. The next section introduces the related deﬁnitions,
and it shows the existence of ﬁxed points onCPOs. In Section , extended (semi-) uniform
g-modular games are presented, and the Nash equilibrium set is characterized. Finally,
Section  concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Let X be a nonempty set on which a reﬂexive, antisymmetric, and transitive binary re-
lation, denoted by ≤, is deﬁned. (X,≤) turns out to be a complete partially ordered set
(CPO) if (i) X has a bottom element,⊥; and (ii) for each directed subsetD of X, the supre-
mum exists. An equivalent deﬁnition writes as (ii′) each chain in X has a supremum.c
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Furthermore, only for notational purposes, we let Y to be some complete lattice satisfying
X ⊂ Y . By the topological characterization of completeness (see Birkhoﬀ []), Y is com-
pact in its interval topology which is the topology generated by taking the close intervals,
[y, z] = {x ∈ Y : y≤ x≤ z} with y, z ∈ Y , as a subbasis of closed sets. Moreover, let  denote
the greatest element of Y .d
In the deﬁnitions we use throughout the paper, upper contour set of every x ∈ X, for-
mally Ux ≡ {y ∈ X | x≤ y}, is essential. On a CPO, this set can naturally be deﬁned as fol-
lows.Ux is the union of all directed subsets of X including x as a bottom element. Though,
in this study, we obtain this set by a diﬀerent approach: Take an element outside X which
is greater than x. The greatest element, , of the complete lattice Y is utilized only at this
stage. It is straightforward that Ux = [x, ] ∩ X for every x ∈ X. We prefer this approach,
because the following proofs become more tractable. Also, our results become compara-
ble with those of Calciano [] which this paper builds on. Finally, since X is a CPO, ∨ (∧)
may not be well deﬁned on X; if so, we set ∨ (∧) as ∨Y (∧Y ).
A map f : X → X is said to be order preserving if for any x, y ∈ X with x < y, we have
f (x)≤ f (y). For the following deﬁnitions, consider a correspondence F : X → X. The cor-
respondence F is upper increasing if for every x, y ∈ X, x≤ y implies that for every a ∈ F(x),
there is some b ∈ F(y) such that a≤ b. It is lower increasing if for every x, y ∈ X, x≤ y im-
plies that for every b ∈ F(y), there is some a ∈ F(x) such that a ≤ b. These deﬁnitions are
attributed to Smithson []. Moreover, the notions of strong upper/lower increasingness
introduced by Calciano [] are deﬁned as follows. The correspondence F is strongly up-
per increasing if for every x, y ∈ X with x ≤ y, every a ∈ F(x), and every b ∈ F(y), there
is some p ∈ F(y) such that p ∈ [a,a ∨ b] ∩ X. It is strongly lower increasing if for every
x, y ∈ X with x ≤ y, every a ∈ F(x), and every b ∈ F(y), there is some q ∈ F(x) such that
q ∈ [a∧ b,b]∩X.
In this paper, we utilize uniform g-modularity deﬁned by Calciano []. We ﬁrst state a
regularity condition, and then we slightly change the deﬁnition in order to guarantee that
our deﬁnition is applicable to a CPO-setting for any CPO.
Condition  Let Y be a complete lattice, X ⊂ Y be a CPO. We say that (a,b) ∈ X × X
satisﬁes Condition  if b  a implies that [a ∧ b,b) ∩ X = ∅ and a  b implies that
[a∧ b,a)∩X =∅.
Deﬁnition  Let Y be a complete lattice, X ⊂ Y be a CPO, and T be a poset. A function
u : X × T → R is semi-uniform g-modular in (x, t) on X × T if for every (a,b) ∈ X × X
satisfying Condition :
(i) b a implies that there are p ∈ [a∧ b,b) and q ∈ X such that:
(i.a) ∀t ∈ T : u(a, t) + u(b, t)≤ u(p, t) + u(q, t),
(i.b) and furthermore, ∀t′, t′′ ∈ T with t′ < t′′:
u
(
q, t′
)
– u
(
b, t′
)≤ u(q, t′′) – u(b, t′′);
(ii) a b implies that there are p′ ∈ [a∧ b,a) and q′ ∈ X such that:
(ii.a) ∀t ∈ T : u(a, t) + u(b, t)≤ u(p′, t) + u(q′, t),
(ii.b) and furthermore, ∀t′, t′′ ∈ T with t′ < t′′:
u
(
q′, t′
)
– u
(
b, t′
)≤ u(q′, t′′) – u(b, t′′).
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The above deﬁnition of semi-uniform g-modularity does not require q and q′ to be in-
cluded in speciﬁc sets. For our results, we also need a version in which the sets including
q and q′ are restricted.
Condition  Let Y be a complete lattice, X ⊂ Y be a CPO. We say that (a,b) ∈ X × X
satisﬁes Condition  if b  a implies that (a,a ∨ b] ∩ X = ∅ and a  b implies that
(b,a∨ b]∩X =∅.
Deﬁnition  Let Y be a complete lattice, X ⊂ Y be a CPO, and T be a poset. A function
u : X × T → R is uniform g-modular on CPO in (x, t) on X × T if for every (a,b) ∈ X ×X
satisfying Conditions  and :
(i) b a implies that there are p ∈ [a∧ b,b)∩X and q ∈ (a,a∨ b]∩X such that:
(i.a) ∀t ∈ T : u(a, t) + u(b, t)≤ u(p, t) + u(q, t),
(i.b) and furthermore, ∀t′, t′′ ∈ T with t′ < t′′:
u
(
q, t′
)
– u
(
b, t′
)≤ u(q, t′′) – u(b, t′′);
(ii) a b implies that there are p′ ∈ [a∧ b,a)∩X and q′ ∈ (b,a∨ b]∩X such that:
(ii.a) ∀t ∈ T : u(a, t) + u(b, t)≤ u(p′, t) + u(q′, t),
(ii.b) and furthermore, ∀t′, t′′ ∈ T with t′ < t′′:
u
(
q′, t′
)
– u
(
b, t′
)≤ u(q′, t′′) – u(b, t′′).
Finally, the set of ﬁxed points of f relative to X, denoted by ε(f ), is deﬁned as follows:e
ε(f ) =
{
x ∈ X : x = f (x)}.
Synonymously, the set of ﬁxed points of F relative to X is then given by
ε(F) =
{
x ∈ X : x ∈ F(x)}.
2.1 The existence of ﬁxed points on CPOs
Theﬁrst theorem is the existence of ﬁxedpoints of an order-preserving self-mapon aCPO.
In fact, the nonemptiness of the ﬁxed point set already follows from Abian and Brown
[]; however, our proof is in line with Echenique’s [] arguments. Echenique’s [] proof
is constructive in the sense that it gives a procedure for ﬁnding a ﬁxed point. Yet, since the
proof utilizes ordinal numbers, there are notions of constructiveness that the proof would
not satisfy.
Theorem (Abian and Brown []) Let X be a CPO, and f : X → X be an order-preserving
self-map. Then the set of ﬁxed points of f is a nonempty CPO.
Proof See the Appendix. 
Moving to correspondences on CPOs, we know that Smithson [] has proved the
nonemptiness of the ﬁxed point set, and that Stouti [] has shown the existence of the
least ﬁxed point. The following theorem indicates that a weaker notion of increasingness
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is suﬃcient for the existence of the least ﬁxed point. The proof relies on the approach
given in the proof of Theorem .
Theorem  Let X be a CPO, and F : X → X be a correspondence such that for every x ∈ X,
F(x) has a bottom element. If F is lower increasing, then F has a least ﬁxed point.
Proof See the Appendix. 
2.2 The order structure of the set of ﬁxed points
In this section, we provide the conditions under which the set of ﬁxed points turns out to
be a CPO. To our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to present such a result. At this point,
we need further notations to state the necessary assumptions for the proof. Let
A =
{
x ∈ X : ∃y ∈ F(x) : x≤ y}
be the set of elements of X at which F weakly jumps the diagonal. For a ﬁxed h ∈ A, deﬁne
Fh : [h, ]∩X → [h, ]∩X as
Fh(x) = F(x)∩ [h, ].
The set A and the correspondence Fh are borrowed from Calciano [], and they are well
deﬁned in a CPO setting. They are essentially utilized in Lemma  and Theorem  in a
similar way to Calciano’s [].
Lemma Let F : X → X be a correspondence. If F is upper increasing, then Fh is nonempty-
valued.
Proof See Calciano []. 
Theorem  Let Y be a complete lattice, X ⊂ Y be a CPO, and F : X → X be a correspon-
dence. If (i) F is strongly upper increasing and strongly lower increasing; (ii) ∀x ∈ X: F(x) is
a CPO in X; and (iii) ∀h ∈ A and ∀x ∈ X: Fh(x) has a bottom element whenever nonempty,
then the ﬁxed point set of F is a CPO.
Proof Since strong lower increasingness implies lower increasingness, we say that ε(F) has
a bottom element by Theorem . Now, take any directed nonempty subset E of ε(F). We
have to show that
∨
ε(F) E exists. If E is ﬁnite, then the result is trivial. Then assume oth-
erwise, and let h =
∨
E. Noting that E is a directed set, let (xn) be an increasing sequence
consisting of all elements of E. As h is the least upper bound of E, the inﬁnite intersection⋂{x ∈ X | xi ≤ x < h} =∅.
Assume that ∃a ∈ F(h) such that a≥ h. Then h ∈ A. If not, there are two cases: (i) ∃a ∈
F(h) such that a < h; and (ii) ∀a ∈ F(h), a and h are unordered. Case (i) has two subcases:
(i.a) ∃xk ∈ E such that xk ≥ a; and (i.b) ∀xi ∈ E, xi  a. Under case (i.a), by strong upper
increasingness, there exists ai ∈ F(h) such that ai ∈ [xi,xi∨a] for every i≥ k. That is ai = xi
for every i ≥ k. We then have a directed subset E′ of F(h). It is obvious that ∨E′ = h.
Since F(h) is a CPO, h is included in F(h). Under cases (i.b) and (ii), we can construct a
directed subset of F(h), denoted by E′′, in such a way that for every xi ∈ E, there exists
Keskin et al. Fixed Point Theory and Applications 2014, 2014:101 Page 6 of 12
http://www.fixedpointtheoryandapplications.com/content/2014/1/101
bi ∈ E′′ such that bi ≥ xi.f Since F(h) is a CPO, the supremum ∨E′′ is included in F(h).
Since the supremum of E is unique, by construction, we have
∨
E′′ ≥ h. That is to say, the
correspondence F weakly jumps the diagonal at h.
In all of the above cases, h ∈ A. For every x ∈ [h, ] ∩ X, Lemma  veriﬁes that Fh(x) is
nonempty. Thus, Fh(x) has a bottom element by assumption. Take any z, z′ ∈ [h, ] ∩ X
such that z≤ z′, and take any y ∈ Fh(z) and y′ ∈ Fh(z′). If y≤ y′, then Fh is lower increasing.
If otherwise, there are two cases. Either y′ < y, or y and y′ are unordered. For the former
case, by strong lower increasingness of F , there exists t ∈ F(z) such that h ≤ y′ = y ∧ y′ ≤
t ≤ y′, concluding that y′ ∈ Fh(z). For the latter case, by strong lower increasingness of F ,
there exists t ∈ F(z) with y ∧ y′ ≤ t ≤ y′. As h ≤ y ∧ y′ ≤ t, we have t ∈ Fh(z). By applying
Theorem  for Fh, we ﬁnd that ε(Fh) is nonempty and has a least element. Let e∗ ∈ ε(Fh) be
the least ﬁxed point of Fh. Check that e∗ ∈ ε(F) by the deﬁnition of a ﬁxed point. If e¯ ∈ ε(F)
is an upper bound on E, then e¯ ≥ h. This implies that e¯ ∈ ε(Fh), i.e., e∗ ≤ e¯. We conclude
that e∗ =
∨
ε(F) E which completes the proof that the supremum of E exists. Thus, ε(F) is
a CPO. 
3 General complementarities on CPOs
Let  = (N , (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a normal form game in which N is the player set, Xi is the
set of strategies for player i ∈ N , and ui : X → R is the utility function for player i ∈ N
where X ≡∏i∈N Xi denotes the set of strategy proﬁles.
For a normal form game, a strategy proﬁle x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium if for every i ∈N ,
and every xi ∈ Xi,
ui
(
x∗
)≥ ui
(
xi,x∗–i
)
.
Accordingly, for a given x–i ∈ X–i ≡∏j∈N\{i} Xj, the best response of player i ∈N is deﬁned
as the set of maximizers. In particular, the best response correspondence of i ∈N , denoted
by Bi : X–i → Xi, is
Bi(x–i) =
{
x∗i | ∀x′i ∈ Xi : ui
(
x∗i ,x–i
)≥ ui
(
x′i,x–i
)}
.
Then the joint best response correspondence, denoted by F : X → X, is deﬁned as
F(x) =
∏
i∈N
Bi(x–i).
This, in turn, implies that a strategy proﬁle x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium if x∗ ∈ F(x∗); i.e.,
if it is a ﬁxed point of the joint best response correspondence.
3.1 Extended semi-uniform g-modular games and the existence of Nash
equilibria
In this section, we ﬁrst show that under semi-uniform g-modularity, the set of maximizers
is strongly lower increasing which provides us more than we need to apply Theorem .
Theorem  Let Y be a complete lattice, X ⊂ Y be a compact CPO in its interval topology,
and T be a poset. Assume that u : X × T → R is upper semi-continuous in x on X, for
every t in T , and is semi-uniform g-modular in (x, t) on X × T . Let B(t) denote the set of
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maximizers for a given t ∈ T . If every (a,b) ∈ B(t) × B(t′) satisﬁes Condition  for every
t, t′ ∈ T with t ≤ t′, then B is strongly lower increasing.
Proof This result can, in fact, be attributed to Calciano [] since an extension to CPOs
does not aﬀect the monotonicity of the set of maximizers. See the Appendix for a detailed
proof. 
Next two deﬁnitions extend the domain of games with weak general complementarities
(see Calciano []) to CPOs.
Deﬁnition  A game has extendedweak general complementarities on CPOs (hence, is
a GEWGC) if (i) each strategy set Xi (a subset of a complete lattice Y ) is a CPO; (ii) ∀x ∈ X:
the joint best reply correspondence F is nonempty and has a least element; and (iii) F is
lower increasing.
Deﬁnition Agame is extended semi-uniform g-modular if (i) each individual strategy
space Xi (a subset of a complete lattice Y ) is a compact CPO; (ii) every utility function ui is
upper semi-continuous in own strategies xi for every strategy proﬁle of the other players
x–i; (iii) every ui is semi-uniform g-modular in (xi,x–i); and (iv) ∀x,x′ ∈ X with x ≤ x′:
every (a,b) ∈ F(x) × F(x′) satisﬁes Condition  where F is the corresponding joint best
reply correspondence.
Theorem  Let  be an extended semi-uniform g-modular game. Then  is a GEWGC,
and the least Nash equilibrium of  exists.
Proof Weneed to show that all three properties of a GEWGC are satisﬁed: (i) is trivial and
(iii) follows from Theorem . For (ii), we refer to Calciano [], and we provide a detailed
proof in the Appendix. Then, by Theorem , there exists the least ﬁxed point of the joint
best reply correspondence, which is the least Nash equilibrium of the game. 
So far, we have provided the conditions for games with CPO strategy sets to have a Nash
equilibrium. The following result is the comparative statics property due to Topkis [],
a well-appreciated property of extremal equilibria in games with strategic complementar-
ities.
Theorem  Let T be a partially ordered set, and (t)t∈T be a collection of games with ex-
tended weak general complementarities such that the joint best reply correspondence F(·, t)
is lower increasing in (x, t) on X × T and has a bottom element for every (x, t) ∈ X × T .
Then the least Nash equilibrium is increasing in t.
Proof Let F(·, t) be the joint best reply correspondence of the game t . Noting that a bot-
tom element exists in every F(x, t), deﬁne ft(x) =
∧
F(x, t) for every (x, t) ∈ X × T . The
function ft is order preserving since F(·, t) is lower increasing. Pick any t′ < t′′ in T . Let 
be the set of all ordinal numbers, and be the linear order on ordinal numbers. For every
t ∈ {t′, t′′}, deﬁne gt :→ X by transﬁnite recursion as gt() =⊥, and
gt(β) =
∨{
ft
(
gt(α)
)
: β  α}.
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Recalling the arguments from Theorems  and , we know that the smallest ﬁxed points
e∗t′ and e∗t′′ of the games t′ and t′′ can be obtained by using gt′ and gt′′ respectively.
Also, lower increasingness of F(·, t) in (x, t) implies that gt is order preserving. Noting
that gt′ (β)≤ gt′′ (β) for every β ∈, one has e∗t′ ≤ e∗t′′ . 
The following section is devoted to the order structure of Nash equilibria.
3.2 Extended uniform g-modular games and the order structure of Nash
equilibria
In this section, we present additional assumptions under which the set of Nash equilib-
rium is a CPO. The theorem below indicates that under uniform g-modularity, the set of
maximizers is strongly upper increasing and strongly lower increasing.
Theorem  Let Y be a complete lattice, X ⊂ Y be a compact CPO in its interval topology,
and T be a poset. Assume that u : X×T → R is upper semi-continuous in x on X, for every
t in T , and is uniform g-modular on CPO in (x, t) on X × T . Let B(t) denote the set of
maximizers for a given t ∈ T . If every (a,b) ∈ B(t) × B(t′) satisﬁes Conditions  and  for
every t, t′ ∈ T with t ≤ t′, then B is strongly upper increasing and strongly lower increasing.
Proof The result follows from Calciano []. See the Appendix for a detailed proof. 
Then we deﬁne two classes of games, and show that the set of Nash equilibrium is a
CPO for these games.
Deﬁnition  A game  has extended general complementarities on CPOs (hence, is a
GEGC) if (i) each strategy setXi (a subset of a complete latticeY ) is aCPO; (ii) the joint best
reply correspondence F is strongly upper increasing; (iii) F is strongly lower increasing;
(iv) ∀x ∈ X: F(x) is a CPO in X; and (v) ∀h ∈ A and ∀x ∈ X: the correspondence Fh(x) has
a bottom element whenever nonempty.
Deﬁnition  A game  is extended uniform g-modular if (i) each strategy set Xi (a subset
of a complete lattice Y ) is a compact CPO such that the lower contour set of each x ∈ X
is closed;g (ii) every utility function ui is upper semi-continuous in own strategies xi for
every strategy proﬁle of the other players x–i; (iii) every ui is uniform g-modular on CPO
in (xi,x–i); and (iv) ∀x,x′ ∈ X with x ≤ x′: every (a,b) ∈ F(x)× F(x′) satisﬁes Conditions 
and  where F is the corresponding joint best reply correspondence.
Theorem  Let  be an extended uniform g-modular game. Then  is a GEGC, and the
Nash equilibrium set of  is a CPO.
Proof Weneed to show that all four properties of a GEGC are satisﬁed: (i) is trivial, (ii) and
(iii) follow fromTheorem, and (v) follows from an approach similar to the one used in the
proof of Theorem . For (iv), we need to show that F(x) is a CPO for every x ∈ X. Note that
since F⊥ coincides with F , it is true that F has a bottom element. Then take any x ∈ X and
any directed set E ⊂ F(x). We need to show that∨F(x) E exists. If E is ﬁnite, then the result
trivially follows. Assume otherwise, and set k =
∨
E. Now, we aim to construct a sequence
in E converging to k. We start by taking e ∈ E. Then there must be an element e ∈ E
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such that e < e < k. This follows because E is inﬁnite and directed. Since X is compact,
and the lower contour sets are closed, this construction returns a sequence (en) ∈ E such
that (en) → k. Since each ui is upper semi-continuous, k ∈ E ⊂ F(x). Hence, ∨F(x) E = k
so that
∨
F(x) E exists. Then, by Theorem , the set of ﬁxed points of the joint best reply
correspondence, that is, the Nash equilibrium set is a CPO. 
4 Conclusion
In this study, we ﬁrst provide a short proof for the existence of ﬁxed points of monotone
correspondences deﬁned on CPOs, in a constructive way that Echenique [] has proved
Tarski [] and Zhou [] ﬁxed point theorems.We also give conditions under which the set
of ﬁxed points turns out to be a nonempty CPO. Thereafter, we prove the nonemptiness
of the set of Nash equilibria for extended semi-uniform g-modular games, and we show
that the set of Nash equilibria is a nonempty CPO for extended uniform g-modular games.
Finally, we provide a monotone comparative statics result on the equilibrium set.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem h Let  be the set of all ordinal numbers, and  be the linear order on
ordinal numbers. Deﬁne g :→ X by transﬁnite recursion as g() =⊥, and
g(β) =
∨{
f
(
g(α)
)
: β  α}.
The function g is order preserving by deﬁnition. For each α ∈, it follows that g(α + ) =
f (g(α)). By the axiom of replacement, there must exist γ ∈ such that g(γ ) = g(γ + ). Let
γ ∗ be the smallest of such γ ’s.i Finally, let e∗ = g(γ ∗). Then e∗ = f (e∗), so that e∗ is a ﬁxed
point of f . In fact, it is the smallest ﬁxed point of f . To see this, take any e ∈ ε(f ). If e =⊥,
then e∗ =⊥ is the smallest element of ε(f ). If e >⊥, there exists α such that g(α) < e. Since f
is an order-preserving map, g(α + ) = f (g(α))≤ f (e) = e. By transﬁnite induction, we have
e∗ ≤ e, concluding that e∗ is the smallest ﬁxed point.
Then we need to show that each directed nonempty subset E of ε(f ) has a supremum;
i.e.,
∨
ε(f ) E exists. Let x =
∨
ε(f ) E, and let UE = {y ∈ X : x ≤ y} be the set of upper bounds
of E. Note that f (UE) is a subset of UE , because for every y ∈ UE and every e ∈ E, we
have e ≤ f (y) since e = f (e) ≤ f (y). Let ϕ = f |UE . Then ϕ maps UE into UE , and ϕ is order
preserving as well. Hence, ε(ϕ) has a smallest element. By deﬁnition of ϕ, this smallest
element is
∨
ε(f ) E. Thus, ε(f ) is a CPO. 
Proof of Theorem  Deﬁne f : X → X such that f (x) =∧F(x) for every x ∈ X. Note that
f (x) ∈ F(x) and f is order preserving by construction. By Theorem , there is a smallest
ﬁxed point; say e∗ ∈ ε(f ). We also have e∗ = f (e∗) ∈ F(e∗) and, thus, e∗ ∈ ε(F). We have
shown that ε(F) is nonempty. Take any e ∈ ε(F). As in the proof of Theorem , one can
then easily show e∗ ≤ e, so that e∗ is the smallest ﬁxed point. 
Proof of Theorem  Here, we construct the directed subset E′′ ⊂ F(h) in such a way that
for every xi ∈ E, there exists bi ∈ E′′ such that bi ≥ xi. Consider the bottom element of
F(h), say a. For every xi ∈ E, by strong upper increasingness, ∃ai ∈ F(h) such that ai ∈
[xi,xi ∨a]. Since a is the bottom element, we also have a≤ ai. That is to say, ai ∈ [a,xi ∨a].
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Consequently, ai ∈ [xi,xi ∨ a]∩ [a,xi ∨ a]. This implies that ai = xi ∨ a. Recalling that (xn)
is an increasing sequence, the set of all ai’s is the desired set E′′. 
Proof of Theorem  Since u is upper semi-continuous, and X is compact, B(t) is closed
and nonempty. Take a ∈ B(t′) and b ∈ B(t′′) with t′ ≤ t′′. If a ≤ b, then the result trivially
follows. Consider the case that they are unordered. Since b a, there exist p ∈ [a ∧ b,b)
and q ∈ X such that
≤ u(a, t′) – u(p, t′)≤ u(q, t′) – u(b, t′)≤ u(q, t′′) – u(b, t′′)≤ ,
where the second inequality follows from Deﬁnition (i.a), the third follows from Deﬁni-
tion (i.b), and the rest follow from the optimality of a and b. Thus, p ∈ B(t′) which we
need to show.
The only remaining case is b < a. Now, we have to show that b ∈ B(t′) to prove strong
lower increasingness. Note that there exist p′ ∈ [a∧ b,a) and q′ ∈ X such that
≤ u(a, t′) – u(p′, t′
)≤ u(q′, t′) – u(b, t′)≤ u(q′, t′′) – u(b, t′′)≤ ,
implying that p′ ∈ B(t′). Since [a ∧ b,a) ≡ [b,a), we have p′ ≥ b. If p′ = b, we are done. If
not, then itmust be the case that p′ > b. By the same argumentwe can ﬁnd some p′ ∈ [p′,a)
such that p′ ∈ B(t′). If p′ = b, we are done. If not, we can ﬁnd p′ by repeating the argument.
We either have some p′n ∈ B(t′) with p′n = b, or we ﬁnd a sequence (p′n) which is strictly
decreasing and bounded from below by b. The former completes the proof, and the latter
implies that the sequence converges to some m ∈ B(t′) with m ≥ b by the fact that B(t′)
is closed in the interval topology of X. Now, if m = b, we are done. If not, then m > b.
By the same process, we can construct a convergent sequence between m and b, which
converges tom which is not less than b. At the end, either we have somemn = b, or we ﬁnd
a sequence (mn) ∈ B(t′) converging to b. Since B(t′) is closed, we have b ∈ B(t′), concluding
that B(t) is strongly lower increasing. 
Proof of Theorem  Here, we only prove (ii) which states that F(x) has a bottom element.
Take any x ∈ X. If F(x) is a chain, we are done. If not, take any unordered y, y′ ∈ F(x). Con-
sider yi, y′i ∈ Bi(x–i). We need to show that yi ∧ y′i ∈ Bi(x–i). By semi-uniform g-modularity,
ui(yi,x–i) + ui
(
y′i,x–i
)≤ ui(p,x–i) + ui(q,x–i)
for some p ∈ [yi ∧ y′i, yi) and q ∈ Xi, implying that p,q ∈ Bi(x–i). By a sequence con-
struction similar to the one in the proof of Theorem , one can show that yi ∧ y′i ∈ Bi(x–i).
Repeating similar arguments for each i ∈N , we have y∧ y′ ∈ F(x). Hence, F(x) has a bot-
tom element. 
Proof of Theorem  Since u is upper semi-continuous, and X is compact, B(t) is closed
and nonempty. Take a ∈ B(t′) and b ∈ B(t′′) with t′ ≤ t′′. If a ≤ b, then the result trivially
follows. Consider the case that they are unordered. Since b a, by uniform g-modularity,
there exist p ∈ [a∧ b,b)∩X and q ∈ (a,a∨ b]∩X such that
≤ u(a, t′) – u(p, t′)≤ u(q, t′) – u(b, t′)≤ u(q, t′′) – u(b, t′′)≤ ,
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where the second inequality follows from Deﬁnition (i.a), the third follows from Deﬁni-
tion (i.b), and the rest follow from the optimality of a and b. Thus, p ∈ B(t′) and q ∈ B(t′′).
The former implies strong lower increasingness, and the latter implies strong upper in-
creasingness. The only remaining case is b < a. Now, showing that a ∈ B(t′′) and b ∈ B(t′)
is enough to prove strong upper increasingness and strong lower increasingness, respec-
tively. Since we have a  b, by uniform g-modularity, there exist p′ ∈ [a ∧ b,a) ∩ X and
q′ ∈ (b,a∨ b]∩X such that
≤ u(a, t′) – u(p′, t′)≤ u(q′, t′) – u(b, t′)≤ u(q′, t′′) – u(b, t′′)≤ ,
implying that p′ ∈ B(t′) and q′ ∈ B(t′′). Since (b,a∨b]≡ (b,a] and [a∧b,a)≡ [b,a), we have
q′ ≤ a and p′ ≥ b. Let us consider strong lower increasingness ﬁrst: If p′ = b, we are done.
If not, then it must be the case that p′ > b. By a sequence construction similar to the one in
the proof of Theorem , we can ﬁnd a decreasing sequence bounded by bwhich converges
tom ∈ B(t′) withm ≥ b. We continue constructing such sequences until we reach some
mn = b, or the sequence (mn) converges to b ∈ B(t′), concluding that B is strongly lower
increasing. For strong upper increasingness, a similar method applies to ﬁnd increasing
convergent sequences bounded by a from above. That completes the proof. 
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Endnotes
a Moreover, Calciano [20] has extended the monotone comparative statics results of Milgrom and Shannon [21] to
general binary algebras.
b See Acemoglu and Jensen [18] for the details in an aggregate large game context.
c This deﬁnition is provided by Davey and Priestly [22]. In some studies, such a set is also referred to as CPO with
bottom element or pointed CPO.
d Note that the set Y is arbitrary, and so is its greatest element 1. In fact, we only need a set including an element
which is greater than every x ∈ X .
e It is also referred to as the ﬁxed point set of f .
f The construction of this directed set is relegated to the Appendix.
g Lower contour set of x on X is deﬁned as {y ∈ X | y ≤ x}. Note that closedness is a topological property, and recall
that we use the interval topology.
h We do not claim the originality of the proof as it signiﬁcantly borrows from Echenique [15]. We give this proof to
show that Echenique’s [15] proof can be generalized to hold on a CPO; a result that may not seem trivial to the
reader.
i Note that γ ∗ is well deﬁned as any set of ordinal numbers has a smallest element.
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